On Ghazālī’s al-Iqtisād-Part 4

“The occurrence of every occurrent has a cause; the world is an occurrent; it necessarily follows that it has a cause. We mean by “the world” all existents other than God. And we mean by ‘all existents other than God’ all the bodies and their modes”

_Ghazālī, al-Iqtisād.I.§1

According to Ghazālī, God is the proximate cause or agent of the existence of the world, which is temporally-originated. The proximate cause of the existence of a temporally-originated effect [world] is either a complete cause that is sufficient in itself for the emanation of its effect from its essence; or it is an incomplete cause that is not sufficient in itself for the emanation of its effect from its essence. If the proximate cause of the existence of a temporally-originated effect, is an incomplete cause that is not sufficient in itself for the emanation of its effect from its essence, then, it would be dependent upon another_ for instance, the conjunction with its essence of an extraneous factor, such as, a property, attribute or feature e.g., an emergent will_ for the procession of its effect from its essence. But dependence is contrary to essential-necessity. Hence, the Necessary Existent cannot be the incomplete cause of the existence of the world.

Now, the proximate & complete cause of the existence of a temporally-originated effect [world] is a cause that is sufficient in itself for the emanation of its effect from its essence, because it is not devoid of any property, feature, attribute or characteristic that is necessary for it to produce its effect. Now, this proximate & complete cause that is sufficient in itself for the emanation of its effect from its essence, is either eternal or temporal. If it is eternal, then, the effect cannot be temporally-originated, because to posit the procession of a temporally-originated effect from an eternal, proximate & complete cause that is sufficient in itself for the emanation of its effect from its essence. implies that the cause were previously [i.e. prior to the emanation of the effect] devoid of any property, feature, attribute or characteristic deemed necessary for it to produce its effect, and this evidently entails a contradiction.

Again, to posit the procession of a temporally-originated effect from an eternal, proximate & complete cause that is sufficient in itself for the emanation of its effect from its essence. implies the simultaneous existence and nonexistence of the [complete] cause of the existence of the temporally-originated effect. This is because, the cause of the existence of a thing, is the existence of its [complete] cause; and the cause of the nonexistence of a thing, is the nonexistence of the [complete] cause of its existence. Hence, the cause of the nonexistence of a temporally-originated thing, is the nonexistence of the [complete] cause of its existence, during the period of that thing’s nonexistence. To posit the nonexistence of a thing given the existence of the [complete] cause of its existence, implies the simultaneous existence or presence of both the [complete] cause of its existence, and the cause of its nonexistence. But the cause of the nonexistence of a thing, is the nonexistence of the [complete] cause of its existence. Therefore, to posit the nonexistence of a thing given the existence of its [complete] cause, implies the simultaneous existence and nonexistence of the [complete] cause of its existence, and this clearly entails a contradiction.

And if the proximate & complete cause that is sufficient in itself for the procession of its temporally-originated effect from its essence, were itself temporally-originated, then, it would itself be dependent upon an extraneous cause for the realization of its existence, because everything temporally-originated is dependent upon an external cause for the derivation of its existence. But dependence is contrary to essential-necessity. Therefore, the absolutely self-sufficient Necessary Existent cannot be the temporally-originated, proximate cause, of the existence of the world.